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On the 5th of May 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) delivered
its anticipated judgement on the PSPP case. This decision once again reveals the
problem of autonomy between constitutional orders and the connection between
autonomy and conferral. Conflicting methodologies, however, if understood as a
criterion to ascertain competence on behalf of one of the autonomous orders, can
never be resolved without the definition of a judicial last word.
The judgement of the FCC: autonomy and conferral
After the FCC’s judgement, the blogosphere, as expected, exploded with
commentary. For the most part (contrary to Dieter Grimm), commentary criticized the
judgement, ranging from full-fledged catastrophists to mild-positivists. It is useless
to reproduce the conversations that took place but worth remembering the key-
importance of this case-law for the European project.
As it was well explained here, the problem with the Weiss/PSPP judgements is
not solely the fact that it is a clash between a constitutional court of a Member
State and the CJEU. There have been cases before where constitutional courts
of Member States challenged the division of competences under the cover of ultra
vires control (see here (Denmark) and here (Czech Republic)). The FCC itself
never truly accepted the idea of a primacy of EU Law, and always reserved the
right to act under such ultra vires control since the Maastricht judgement, through
Honeywell and then in the famous Gauweiler. It is rather that it represents a conflict
of autonomous methodologies.
In fact, one thing that has been consistently ignored throughout this discussion is the
role that autonomy of EU law might play in all of this. The FCC did to the CJEU what
the CJEU did to many international courts, tribunals and other dispute settlement
bodies for many years – attack the core of its legitimacy. It used its own autonomy, in
the shape of an independent methodology, to strike its blow.
From judicial autonomy to methodological
autonomy
As explained in a post by one of us, the principle of autonomy of EU law has been
essential to ensure coherence of interpretation throughout the life of the Union. Its
genesis lies in the early beginnings of CJEU’s jurisprudence, in core cases such
as Van Gend en Loos (‘a new legal order’) or Costa (‘by contrast with ordinary
international treaties, the ECC has created its own legal system’). The idea of
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essential characteristics of the EU, as an innovative and autonomous community
of law, set the founding stone for principles such as the primacy or the direct effect
and autonomous fundamental rights. The EU Law had primacy over the law of its
Member States precisely because the Member States had agreed to create an
autonomous body of law whose coherence could only be ensured if there was a
higher judicial voice above domestic courts. That voice was ultimately found in the
CJEU.
Embedded in this idea, however, there is a connection between autonomy and the
principle of conferral. While the latter defines the limits of both constitutional spheres,
between the EU and Member States, the former protects them, ensuring uniformity
and preventing fragmentation. Above all, autonomy dictated who ruled over each
of the defined spheres and kept both constitutional orders happy. This maintained
the delicate equilibrium that Joseph Weiler described a long time ago, both on the
external and internal dimensions of integration.
Such equilibrium is of course dependent of a tacit consensus, accepted by both
constitutional courts and the CJEU, that European and constitutional spheres of
autonomy would be kept intact. When the CJEU developed the idea of the respect
for constitutional traditions (Omega), later on included in Article 4(2) TEU, the
CJEU ensured that the sphere of constitutional autonomy that belonged to Member
States remained intact. Likewise, in the Maastricht judgement, the FCC reminded
the CJEU that they reserved the power to exercise an ultra vires control, taming
potential abuses of conferral by the Union. Both constituted exercises of balancing
of a delicate share of competences between two distinct autonomies living side-by-
side.
One should, however, distinguish two types of autonomy: a judicial and a
methodological.
The notion of judicial autonomy aims at ensuring that, under each of the
constitutional orders, there is a court responsible for guaranteeing uniformity
of application of that law. This is largely what made autonomy famous. First by
protecting EU law from Member States (Odermatt’s internal autonomy) with the
CJEU as the engine of European integration. Then by protecting EU law from
the threat of globalization and the international legal order (Odermatt’s external
autonomy). Here we find vast jurisprudence that includes several Opinions (C-1/91,
C-1/00, C-1/09, C-2/13 and C-1/17) and contentious cases such as Mox Plant or
Achmea. In both moments, however, one thing was clear: judicial autonomy of the
EU meant that the CJEU had the last word (Article 340 TFEU).
From this general judicial autonomy derives a more specific methodological
autonomy. Instead of defining whose court is responsible for ensuring uniformity of
that legal order, methodological autonomy states that, on that legal order, it is the
methodology defined by such ruling court the one which ought to be followed.
In simple terms, in the EU legal order, judicial autonomy gives the CJEU the sole
power to state the right answer to a specific case, while methodological autonomy
ensures that the means to arrive to such answer cannot be contested.
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However, with this PSPP judgement, the FCC challenged this last assertion. It
questioned the competence demarcation established by conferral by attacking the
methodology followed by the CJEU. By doing this, the FCC is striking at the core of
the autonomy social contract and jeopardizing the equilibrium.
Conflicting methodologies: why proportionality?
This methodological assault is clear when considering the judicial exchange in
Weiss/PSPP. Indeed, the framing of the third and fourth preliminary questions
suggested how the German constitutional justices aimed at connecting conferral and
proportionality. The CJEU refused to mix up both principles, verifying first conferral
(Weiss, 53-70), then proportionality (Weiss, 71-100). Convinced that conferral should
incorporate a comprehensive proportionality assessment, and unhappy with the
CJEU’s methodology as regards to the latter, Karlsruhe cried ultra vires (PSPP,
123). Canonically, however, from an EU Law perspective, proportionality regulates
the exercise of an EU competence, but it does not define the existence thereof. In
other words, if an EU act breaches proportionality it would be disproportionate and,
consequently, invalid, but not necessarily beyond the EU’s conferred powers.
The competence conundrum at the heart of the Weiss case can be understood
as one of indirect legislation in a broad sense, meaning the adoption of federal
acts where the federal direct competence is limited. The EU has a competence on
monetary policy and acts based on such competence may (or rather will) pursue,
indirectly, other objectives, say economic policy objectives. These phenomena
raise one of federalism’s existential questions: if the exercise of a competence
will, by nature, willingly or unwillingly, pursue other objectives, what good is
conferral? Conferral contains, to some extent, the vertical spill-over between fields
of competences, but it does not eradicate it. As Alan Dashwood explains, conferral
is ensured by a certain drafting technique, detailing the provisions constituting the
legal bases authorizing action in a determined policy area or in pursuance of a
determined objective, and no other. Text, however, has its wittgensteinian limitations
and, consequently, so does conferral.
Should other principles (say proportionality) step in? Some might sustain (in part
correctly) that some form of proportionality reasoning took place in the leading case
on conferral invalidation, Tobacco Advertising I. In that instance, the CJEU had
found, after all, that the EU act exceeded the scope of the action permitted by the
legal base, Article 114 TFEU. We find, however, that the CJEU only tested, for that
purpose, suitability. Indeed, according to the CJEU’s conferral methodology, if the
legal base is drafted in view of the pursuance of an objective (which ultimately every
legal base is, difference lying in the vagueness of the text), the derived legal act
should, in this way, be suitable to pursue such objective. It would be, in this sense,
almost a syllogistic imperative to confront the meaning of the conferring provision
with the derived act. Indeed, if the conferring provision is defined by an objective,
then suitability would become the ‘lever’ for the judicial syllogism. The legal base,
as authoritatively interpreted, will pursue a certain objective and in order to respect
conferral the adopted act would have to be suitable to pursue such objective. In
the case of Directive 98/43/EC, the CJEU ultimately found, via suitability, that
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prohibiting certain forms of advertisement “in no way [helped] to facilitate trade in
the products concerned” (Tobacco Advertising I, 99) and, thus, such obligation
breached conferral. And so went the reasoning in Weiss, this time favoring validity
and employing a lower intensity of review: as it does not appear manifestly inapt at
the maintenance of price stability, Decision (EU) 2015/774 falls within the sphere
of monetary policy competences (Weiss, 57), a conclusion which is independent of
possible economic policy spill-overs (Weiss, 58 et seq.).
But should a proportionality reasoning during a control of conferral go beyond the
test of suitability? Considering the CJEU’s methodology, in an instance of conferral
control, no. Indeed, there would be no syllogistic purpose for necessity, let alone
reasonableness.
Examining the PSPP judgment, after stating that a “generous interpretation of
the specific competence conferred may, to a certain extent, be compensated
by a sound proportionality assessment” (PSPP, 128), the constitutional justices
ultimately decided that the CJEU’s application of the principle of proportionality,
specifically of the test of reasonableness, did not fulfil an alleged ‘corrective function’
for the purposes of safeguarding the competences of the Member States (PSPP,
133), confirming, in this way, Karlsruhe’s own (from an EU Law point of view,
questionable) methodology regarding conferral. Ultimately, thus, this constitutional
clash amounts to a conflict of methodologies, not regarding proportionality, but
conferral. Who is right, or, more importantly, who gets to decide who is right?
Resolving the problem: the definition of a last word
This conundrum of methodologies is actually a conflict between two autonomous
legal systems. The problem cannot be simply resolved by resorting to norms such
as 340 TFEU, as this belongs to one of the systems. It is therefore urgent to define
a judicial last word that resolves such conflicts. Only this will prevent decisions such
as PSPP that ultimately challenge the power of the CJEU and its methodological
autonomy. We therefore urge legal scholars to come up with innovative solutions,
such as the one proposed by Joseph Weiler and Daniel Sarmiento, to bring legal and
methodological certainty to the EU. Only such solutions might serve to rebalance the
autonomy’s equilibrium and reestablish the balance of legitimacies between the EU
and Member States.
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